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Abstract
In its normal form prisoners’ dilemma (PD) is represented by a payoff matrix showing players
strategies and payoffs. To obtain distinguishing trait and strategic form of PD certain constraints
are imposed on the elements of its payoff matrix. We quantize PD by generalized quantization
scheme to analyze its strategic behavior in quantum domain. The game starts with general entan-
gled state of the form |ψ〉 = cos ξ
2
|00〉 + i sin ξ
2
|11〉 and the measurement for payoffs is performed
in entangled and product bases. We show that for both measurements there exist respective cutoff
values of entanglement of initial quantum state up to which strategic form of game remains intact.
Beyond these cutoffs the quantized PD behaves like chicken game up to another cutoff value. For
the measurement in entangled basis the dilemma is resolved for sin ξ > 1
7
with Q⊗Q as a NE but
the quantized game behaves like PD when sin ξ > 1
3
; whereas in the range 1
7
< sin ξ < 1
3
it behaves
like chicken game (CG) with Q⊗Q as a NE. For the measurement in product basis the quantized
PD behaves like classical PD for sin2 ξ
2
< 1
3
with D ⊗ D as a NE. In region 1
3
< sin2 ξ
2
< 3
7
the
quantized PD behaves like classical CG with C ⊗D and D ⊗ C as NE.
∗Electronic address: ahmad@ele.qau.edu.pk
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory deals with a situation where two or more rational players are involved in a
strategic contest to maximize their payoffs [1]. The payoff of each player depends on his own
strategy and on the strategies adopted by other players [2]. The set of strategies from which
unilateral deviation of any player reduces his/ her payoff is called Nash Equilibrium (NE) of
the game [3]. In its normal form a game is represented by a bi-matrix with its elements as
payoffs. A set of constraints is necessary to impose on the elements of the payoff matrix to
obtain the strategic form of the game. For example, prisoner dilemma (PD), which is a story
of two prisoners who have allegedly committed a crime together. They are being interrogated
in separate cells. Each of the prisoners have to decide whether to confess the crime (to defect
D) or to deny the crime (to cooperate C) without any communication between them. If both
players receive R and U for mutual cooperation and defection respectively; and a cooperator
and defector engaged in a contest against each other receive S and T respectively; then the
strategic form of PD demands that T > R > U > S [4, 5]. Due these constraints rational
reasoning forces each player to defect. As a result DD appears as a NE of the game which
is not Pareto optimal. This is referred to as the dilemma of this game.
Chicken game (CG) on the other hand depicts a situation in which two players drive their
cars straight towards each other. The first to swerve to avoid the collision (to cooperate C)
is the loser (chicken) and the one who keeps on driving straight (to defect D) is the winner.
By assigning R and U to mutual cooperation and defection respectively; S and T to a
cooperator and a defector against each other then the strategic form of CG requires that
T > R > S > U [4]. As a result there is no dominant strategy and CD, DC appear as NE.
The dilemma of this game is that CC which is Pareto optimal is not a NE.
This type of dilemmas was resolved by analyzing games in quantum domain. One of the
elegant and foremost step in this direction was by Eisert et al [6] to remove dilemma in PD.
In this quantization scheme the strategy space of the players is a two parameter set of 2× 2
unitary operators. Starting with maximally entangled initial quantum state the authors
showed that for a suitable quantum strategy the dilemma disappears from the game. The
quantum strategy pair Q⊗Q appears as a NE which is Pareto optimal. They also pointed
out that the quantum strategy Q always wins over all classical strategies. Eisert et al [7] also
showed that Q⊗Q is a unique NE in CG and is Pareto optimal. This quantization scheme
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has many interesting applications in quantum game theory [8–21]. Later on, Marinatto and
Weber [22] introduced another interesting and simple scheme for the quantization of non-zero
sum games. They gave Hilbert structure to the strategic spaces of the players. They also
used the maximally entangled initial state and allowed the players to play their tactics by
applying probabilistic choices of unitary operators. Applying their scheme to Battle of Sexes
game they found the strategy for which both the players have equal payoffs. Marinatto and
Weber quantization scheme gave very interesting results while investigating evolutionarily
stable strategies (ESS) [11, 23, 24] and in the analysis of repeated games [25, 26] etc. In
our earlier work we introduced a generalized quantization scheme that establishes a relation
between these two apparently different quantization schemes [27]. Separate set of parameters
were identified for which this scheme reduces to that of Eisert et al [6] and Marinatto and
Weber [22] quantization schemes.
In this paper we address the question that to what extent the strategic form of PD remains
unaffected if it is quantized by generalized quantization scheme [27]. Starting with a general
entangled state of the form |ψ〉 = cos ξ
2
|00〉+ i sin ξ
2
|11〉 we show that the strategic form of
quantized PD depends on entanglement of initial quantum state and as well as on the type
of measurement basis (entangled or product). For both types of measurements there exist
respective cutoff values of entanglement of initial quantum state up to which strategic form
of game remains intact. Beyond these cutoffs the quantized PD behaves like chicken game
up to another cutoff value.
The paper is organized as follows: section (II) is a brief introduction to PD and CG,
section (III) presents that how the strategic form of quantized PD changes by quantization
and section (IV) concludes the main results.
II. PRISONERS’ DILEMMA AND CHICKEN GAME
Prisoner dilemma is the story of two suspects, Alice and Bob, who have allegedly com-
mitted a crime together. They have been arrested and being interrogated in separate cells.
Each of the prisoners have to decide whether to confess the crime or to deny the crime
without any communication between them. In game theory to confess the crime is termed
as “to Defect”,the strategy D and to deny the crime is referred to as “to Cooperate”, the
strategy C. Depending upon their decisions the players obtain the payoffs according the the
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following payoff matrix.
Bob
C D
Alice
C
D

 (3, 3) (0, 5)
(5, 0) (1, 1)

 (1)
It is clear from the above payoff matrix that D is the dominant strategy for both players.
Therefore rational reasoning forces each of them to play D resulting DD as a NE of PD.
From the payoff matrix (1) we see that each player gets (1, 1) as payoff. However, it was
possible for the players to get better payoff of of value (3, 3) if they would have played CC
instead of DD. This is generally known as the dilemma of this game. We can write the
payoff matrix (1) in a general form as
Bob
C D
Alice
C
D

 (R,R) (S, T )
(T, S) (U, U)

 (2)
with
T > R > U > S (3)
as constraint on its elements.
In chicken game (CG) two players, Alice and Bob, drive their cars straight towards each
other. The first to swerve to avoid the collision (the strategy C) is the loser (chicken) and
the one who keeps on driving straight (the strategy D) is the winner. The payoff matrix for
this game can also be of the form (2) but with constraints
T > R > S > U. (4)
Certainly if both players cooperate they can avoid a crash and none of them will be winner.
If one of them steers away (defects D) he will be loser but will survive but the opponent
will receive the entire honor. If they crash then the cost of both of them will be higher than
the cost of being chicken and the payoff will be lower [4, 28]. There is no dominant strategy
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in this game. The strategy pairs (C,D) and (D,C) are two NE in this game. The former
is preferred by Bob and the latter is preferred by Alice. The dilemma of this game is that
CC which is Pareto optimal is not the NE of this game.
III. QUANTIZATION OF PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
In this section we quantize PD using generalized quantization scheme for two person
non zero sum games [27]. In this quantization scheme an arbiter prepares a two qubit
general entangled state and passes on one qubit to each player. After applying their local
unitary operators (strategies) the players return the qubits to arbiter who then, announces
the payoffs by performing the measurement with the application of suitable payoff operators
depending on the payoff matrix of the game. The payoff operators are Bell like states which
transform to Eisert et al [6] operators for maximum entanglement and for zero entanglement
they reduce to the payoff operators used by Marinatto and Weber in their quantization
scheme [22]. There can be four cases of interest. If both the initial quantum state and
payoff operators are in form of product states then classical game is reproduced. When
initial quantum state and the payoff operators are maximally entangled states then this
scheme transforms to Eisert et al [6] quantization scheme. For maximally entangled initial
quantum state and product basis measurement it is reduced to that of Marinatto and Weber
quantization scheme [22]. On the other hand if the game starts with product state but
the measurement for the payoffs is performed in entangled basis then the payoffs are also
quantum mechanical in nature. Where as this feature is absent both in Eisert et al and
Marinatto and Weber quantization schemes.
For the quantization of PD the classical strategies C (to cooperate) and D (to defect) are
assigned two basis vectors |C〉 and |D〉 respectively in a Hilbert space of two level system.
The state of game at any instant is a vector in four dimensional Hilbert space spanned by
the basis vectors |CC〉 , |CD〉 , |DC〉 and |DD〉 . Here the entries in the ket refer to the
qubits possessed by Alice and Bob respectively. Representing |C〉 → |0〉 and |D〉 → |1〉 let
the initial quantum state of game be of the form
|ψ〉 = cos
ξ
2
|00〉+ i sin
ξ
2
|11〉 (5)
where ξ is the entanglement parameter. The strategies of players are represented by unitary
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operators Uj , given as [27]
Uj = cos
θj
2
Rj + sin
θj
2
Cj (6)
where j = A,B and Rj , Cj are the unitary operators defined as
Rj |0〉 = e
iφj |0〉 , Rj |1〉 = e
−iφj |1〉
Cj |0〉 = − |1〉 , Cj |1〉 = |0〉 . (7)
After the application of strategies the initial state given by Eq. (5) transforms into
ρf = (UA ⊗ UB) ρ (UA ⊗ UB)
†
. (8)
The payoff operators of Alice and Bob are
PA = 3P00 + P11 + 5P10
PB = 3P00 + P11 + 5P01 (9)
where
P00 = |ψ00〉 〈ψ00| , |ψ00〉 = cos
δ
2
|00〉+ i sin
δ
2
|11〉 (10a)
P11 = |ψ11〉 〈ψ11| , |ψ11〉 = cos
δ
2
|11〉+ i sin
δ
2
|00〉 (10b)
P10 = |ψ10〉 〈ψ10| , |ψ10〉 = cos
δ
2
|10〉 − i sin
δ
2
|01〉 (10c)
P01 = |ψ01〉 〈ψ01| , |ψ01〉 = cos
δ
2
|01〉 − i sin
δ
2
|10〉 (10d)
and δ ∈
[
0, pi
2
]
is the entanglement of measurement basis. These payoff operators reduce to
that of Eisert et al scheme [6] for δ = pi
2
and for δ = 0 these transform to that of Marinatto
and Weber scheme [22]. The payoff for player i are calculated as
$i (θA, φA, θB, φB) = Tr
(
P iρf
)
. (11)
Since in generalized quantization scheme measurements can be performed in entangled as
well as in product basis therefore we discuss both the cases one by one.
Case 1:- Entangled measurement
When the measurement is performed in entangled basis then using Eqs. (1, 5, 8, 9, 11)
the payoffs of players come out to be
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$A (θA, φA, θB, φB) = [2 + sin ξ cos 2 (φA + φB)] cos
2
θA
2
cos2
θB
2
+
5
2
(1 + sin ξ cos 2φB) sin
2
θA
2
cos2
θB
2
+
5
2
(1− sin ξ cos 2φA) cos
2
θA
2
sin2
θB
2
+ (2− sin ξ) sin2
θA
2
sin2
θB
2
−
(2 + sin ξ)
4
sin θA sin θB sin (φA + φB)
−
5
4
sin θA sin θB sin (φA − φB) . (12)
$B (θA, φA, θB, φB) = [2 + sin ξ cos 2 (φA + φB)] cos
2
θA
2
cos2
θB
2
+
5
2
(1 + sin ξ cos 2φA) sin
2
θB
2
cos2
θA
2
+
5
2
(1− sin ξ cos 2φB) cos
2
θB
2
sin2
θA
2
+ (2− sin ξ) sin2
θA
2
sin2
θB
2
−
(2 + sin ξ)
4
sin θA sin θB sin (φA + φB)
−
5
4
sin θA sin θB sin (φA − φB) . (13)
In this case if the game starts from maximally entangled state then Q ⊗ Q is the only NE
of the game where Q is the unitary operator U (θ, φ) = U
(
0, pi
2
)
[6]. To see the behavior of
Q⊗Q at other values of entanglement we apply the NE conditions as
$A
(
0,
pi
2
, 0,
pi
2
)
− $A
(
θA, φA, 0,
pi
2
)
≥ 0
$B
(
0,
pi
2
, 0,
pi
2
)
− $B
(
0,
pi
2
, θB, φB
)
≥ 0. (14)
With the help of Eqs. (12, 13) for i = A,B the above inequalities give
7 sin ξ + [1 + (2 cos 2φi − 5) sin ξ] cos
2
θi
2
− 1 ≥ 0. (15)
This inequality is satisfied for sin ξ ≥ 1
7
. Therefore Q⊗Q remains NE for a game that starts
with an initial state for which
sin ξ >
1
7
. (16)
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Now we investigate whether the quantum game that we obtained by quantization of PD
with Q⊗ Q as NE possesses the characteristics of PD. Using Eqs. (12, 13) the elements of
payoff matrix of quantized PD are
R = 2 + sin ξ, S =
5− 5 sin ξ
2
, T =
5 + 5 sin ξ
2
, U = 2− sin ξ. (17)
For the above values of payoff elements the constraint (3) is satisfied if sin ξ > 1
3
. It shows
that in quantized PD the resolution of dilemma without effecting its strategic form requires
that the entanglement of initial quantum state must be greater than arcsin 1
3
. It means that
Q⊗Q is the NE of a quantized PD for all values of entanglement for which sin ξ ≥ 1
7
but it
behaves like PD only for sin ξ > 1
3
. This is shown in figure (1). It is evident from figure (1)
that in the region 1
3
≥ sin ξ ≥ 1
7
the constraints on payoff elements transforms to
T > R > S > U. (18)
Comparing with (4) we see that for these values of entanglement the quantized PD behaves
like CG. It means that when PD is quantized with an initial state of entanglement less than
arcsin 1
3
then it transforms to CG but Q⊗Q still remains the NE. When the entanglement
is further reduced and sin ξ < 1
7
then the quantum game again changes its form. In this
region the payoff matrix elements obey the constraints
T > S > R > U (19)
and Q⊗D, D ⊗Q are NE. For Q⊗D the NE conditions
$A (Q,D)− $A (θA, φA, D) ≥ 0
$B (Q,D)− $B (Q, θB, φB) ≥ 0 (20)
become
sin2
θA
2
+
[
7− (2− 5 cos 2φA) cos
2
θA
2
]
sin ξ ≥ 0
[1− (5− 2 cos 2φB) sin ξ] cos
2
θB
2
≥ 0 (21)
These inequalities are satisfied for all θ′s and φ′s if 0 ≤ sin ξ ≤ 1
7
. However at sin ξ = 0 two
new NE C ⊗D and D⊗C also come into play. At this stage we have a game that has four
pure strategies NE. For C ⊗D the NE conditions
$A (C,D)− $A (θA, φA, D) ≥ 0
$B (C,D)− $B (C, θB, φB) ≥ 0 (22)
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yield
sin2
θA
2
−
[
3 + (2− 5 cos 2φA) cos
2
θA
2
]
sin ξ ≥ 0
[1 + (5− 2 cos 2φB) sin ξ] cos
2
θB
2
≥ 0. (23)
These inequalities are satisfied for all θ′s and φ′s for sin ξ = 0 showing that for zero value
of entanglement C ⊗D becomes a NE.
On the other hand it is also obvious from figure (1) there are two points sin ξ = 1
7
and
sin ξ = 1
3
where the constraints on the elements of the payoff matrix are
T > R = S > U (24)
and
T > R > S = U (25)
respectively. The former constraint represents the game called compromise dilemma [4]
whereas the other constraint represents a game that is also different than PD.
R
U
S
T
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Sin Ξ
1
2
3
4
5
Payoffs
FIG. 1: Payoff elements versus sin ξ when the measurement is performed in entngled basis. It
shows that the quantized PD behaves like PD for an initial quantum state for which sin ξ > 1
3
. In
the region 1
3
≥ sin ξ ≥ 1
7
the quantized PD behaves like CG and for sin ξ < 1
7
the form of the game
is again changed.
It proves that when PD starts with a general entangled state of the form (5) and mea-
surement is performed in entangled basis then it behaves like PD up to a certain cutoff value
of entanglement of initial quantum state.
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Case 2:- Product Measurement
When the measurement is performed in product basis then using Eqs. (1, 5, 8, 9, 11) the
payoff of player A comes out to be
$A (θA, φA, θB, φB) =
(
1 + 2 cos2
ξ
2
)
cos2
θA
2
cos2
θB
2
+ 5 cos2
ξ
2
sin2
θA
2
cos2
θB
2
+ 5 sin2
ξ
2
cos2
θA
2
sin2
θB
2
+
(
1 + 2 sin2
ξ
2
)
sin2
θA
2
sin2
θB
2
−
1
4
sin ξ sin θA sin θB sin (φA + φB) . (26)
The payoffs of player B can be found by replacing θA → θB and φA → φB. For these payoffs
C ⊗ C is the NE of the game if
$A (C,C)− $A (θA, φA, C) ≥ 0. (27)
Putting the corresponding values from Eq. (26) we get
sin2
θA
2
(
3 sin2
ξ
2
− 2
)
≥ 0. (28)
This inequality is satisfied if sin2 ξ
2
≥ 2
3
. It shows that C ⊗C is a NE with payoff 3− 2 sin2 ξ
2
for quantized PD that starts with an initial entangled state of the form (5) if sin2 ξ
2
≥ 2
3
.
It is important to note that C ⊗ C being a NE does not imply the resolution of dilemma.
Because for sin2 ξ
2
≥ 2
3
each player could have obtained a better payoff 1+2 sin2 ξ
2
by playing
D instead of C.
For D ⊗D as a NE we have the inequality
$A (D,D)− $A (θA, φA, D) ≥ 0, (29)
which with help of Eq. (26) gives
cos2
θA
2
(
1− 3 sin2
ξ
2
)
≥ 0. (30)
The above inequality is satisfied for sin2 ξ
2
≤ 1
3
showing that D ⊗ D is a NE for quantized
PD if it starts with an initial quantum state with sin2 ξ
2
≤ 1
3
.
The D ⊗ C can be NE if it satisfies the following NE inequalities
$A (D,C)− $A (θA, φA, C) ≥ 0
$B (D,C)− $B (D, θB, φB) ≥ 0. (31)
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With the help of Eq. (26) the above inequalities become
cos2
θA
2
(
2− 3 sin2
ξ
2
)
≥ 0
sin2
θB
2
(
3 sin2
ξ
2
− 1
)
≥ 0. (32)
These inequalities are satisfied if 1
3
≤ sin2 ξ
2
≤ 2
3
. Therefore, D ⊗ C is NE of quantized PD
which starts with an initial entangled state with 1
3
≤ sin2 ξ
2
≤ 2
3
. By similar reasoning it can
be proved that C ⊗ D is NE if the entanglement of initial quantum state is in the range
1
3
≤ sin2 ξ
2
≤ 2
3
.
Now we investigate that how the strategic form of quantized PD depends upon the en-
tanglement of initial state. We find from Eq. (26) that the elements of payoff matrix in this
case are
R = 3− 2 sin2
ξ
2
, S = 5 sin2
ξ
2
, T = 5− 5 sin2
ξ
2
, U = 1 + 2 sin2
ξ
2
. (33)
These elements of the payoff matrix are plotted as a function of sin2 ξ
2
in figure (2). The
figure shows six regions and each region represents a different game. The constraints (3)
required for the game to behave like PD are satisfied in region 1. This region is defined
as 0 ≤ sin2 ξ
2
< 1
3
with D ⊗ D as the NE. In region 2 where 1
3
< sin2 ξ
2
< 3
7
the payoff
matrix elements given in Eq. (33) are transformed into the constraints given in (4). In this
region the quantized PD represents classical CG with C ⊗D and D ⊗ C as NE. When the
entanglement of initial state is further increased then form of the game varies according to
table (I).
Furthermore from figure (2) it can be seen that there are points such as sin2 ξ
2
= 1
3
,
sin2 ξ
2
= 3
7
, sin2 ξ
2
= 1
2
, sin2 ξ
2
= 4
7
and sin2 ξ
2
= 2
3
where two or more payoff matrix elements
are equal. The form of game at these points can be described as follows.
1. At sin2 ξ
2
= 1
3
the payoff matrix elements are related through the constraints T > R >
S = U with R = 2.3333, S = U = 1.6667, and T = 3.3333. Here the game has C ⊗D
and D ⊗ C as NE. But both these NE are not strict [29].
2. At sin2 ξ
2
= 3
7
we see that T > (R = S) > U with R = S = 2.1429, T = 2.8571,
U = 1.8571 and at this point quantized PD behaves like compromise dilemma. In
such a situation it is better to play opposite to the opponent [4].
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Region Entanglement NE Game
1 sin2 ξ
2
< 1
3
D ⊗D Classical PD
2 1
3
< sin2 ξ
2
< 3
7
C ⊗D, D ⊗ C Classical CG
3 3
7
< sin2 ξ
2
< 1
2
C ⊗D, D ⊗ C Neither CG nor PD
4 1
2
< sin2 ξ
2
< 4
7
C ⊗D, D ⊗ C Neither CG nor PD
5 4
7
< sin2 ξ
2
< 2
3
C ⊗D, D ⊗ C Neither CG nor PD
6 sin2 ξ
2
> 2
3
C ⊗ C Neither CG nor PD
TABLE I: Different forms of PD for specified range of initial state entanglement when measurement
is performed in product basis
3. At sin2 ξ
2
= 1
2
the matrix elements obey the constraints (R = U) < (S = T ) where
R = U = 2, S = T = 2.5. Here the game has C ⊗D and D ⊗ C as NE.
4. At sin2 ξ
2
= 4
7
the constraints on the payoff matrix element become S > (T = U) > R
and R = 1.8571, S = 2.8571, T = U = 2.1429. The game has C ⊗ D and D ⊗ C as
NE.
5. At sin2 ξ
2
= 2
3
the constraints take the form S > U > (R = T ) where R = T = 1.6667,
S = 3.3333, U = 2.3333. This game has C ⊗D and D ⊗ C as NE and both these NE
are not strict [29].
Note that for all the above cases the quantized game never behaves like PD.
IV. CONCLUSION
We quantized PD by generalized quantization scheme [27] starting with a general initial
entangled state of the form |ψ〉 = cos ξ
2
|00〉+i sin ξ
2
|11〉 . In this scheme the measurements for
payoffs can be performed in entangled and product bases. For both types of measurements
the strategic form of quantized PD depends upon the entanglement of initial quantum state.
For measurement in entangled basis when the entanglement of initial quantum state is
reduced then beyond a certain level of entanglement the quantized PD behaves like CG
with Q⊗Q as NE. On further reduction of entanglement the game ceased to behave like CG
12
SR
U
T
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Sin2
Ξ
2
1
2
3
4
5
Payoffs
FIG. 2: Payoff elements versus sin2 ξ
2
when the measurement is performed in product basis. The
constraints required for the game to behave like PD are satisfied in region defined by 0 ≤ sin2 ξ
2
< 1
3
.
In the region 1
3
< sin2 ξ
2
< 3
7
the quantized PD behaves classical CG with C⊗D and D⊗C as NE.
and transformed into a new game with Q⊗D and D⊗Q as NE. At last for zero entanglement
two additional NE C⊗D and D⊗C also appeared resulting a game with four pure strategies
NE. When the measurement is performed in product basis then the quantized PD can be
divided in eleven different games with respect to initial state entanglement. In this case
for zero entanglement of initial quantum state the game behaved like PD with D ⊗ D as
NE. With increasing entanglement of initial state there is a cutoff value beyond that game
behaved like CG with C ⊗D and D⊗C as NE. On further increase there appeared another
cutoff value beyond that the quantized PD transformed into a game with C⊗C as NE which
is not Pareto optimal.
The apparent reason for these results is when the players apply their pure strategies ( I
and σ operators) on a maximally entangled state (Bell state) shared between them then the
resulting quantum state is also one of the Bell states. This state overlaps with one of the
payoff operators (10) and is orthogonal to other three operators. Therefore the measurement
of payoffs is is error free. However, when the entanglement of shared quantum state is
reduced then application of pure strategies transform it into a state which overlaps with
two payoff operators (10). The payoffs against the pure strategies ( I and σ operators) are
transformed into the payoffs corresponding to mixed strategies (linear combination of I and
σ ). It changes the strategic form of the game. Similarly the case of product measurements
13
can be explained.
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